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Abstract:  
We study voluntary contribution behavior of individuals who vary in their ability to 
contribute to a joint project under different information scenarios. We investigate a 
situation with two types who vary only in their external marginal return (low and high). 
Results of a laboratory experiment suggest that, when group members are not aware of 
the heterogeneity in their group, both types make the same nominal contributions. When 
agents are informed about the heterogeneity, contributions increase but differently by 
type. 
High types contribute only more with sufficient social exposure, i.e., when information on 
the type of the contributor is available. Low types, on the other hand, contribute only 
more when they are aware of the distribution of types, but have no information on the 
type of the contributor. 
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1 Introduction
Team members who contribute to common projects are, generally speaking, not alike. They
dier, for instance, in their talents, skills, and qualications. In some cases, heterogeneous
abilities are even necessary to achieve a common goal (Papps et al. (2011)) or to be more pro-
ductive (Hamilton et al. (2003)). Ledyard (1995, p.159-160) conjectures that contributions
to joint projects in heterogeneous groups are very likely to be inuenced by the information
about heterogeneity that group members have. In this article, we provide empirical support
for this supposition and show that not heterogeneity itself, but heterogeneity in interaction
with information, impacts contributions.
We employ a public goods experiment, in which we control and vary individual ability and
systematically change the information scenarios under which persons make their contribution
decisions. In a standard public goods experiment, each member of a group decides whether
and how much of his endowment to contribute to a joint project. Each unit an individual
contributes increases the joint project by more than a unit but, as the returns of the joint
project are shared equally among all group members, the individual receives less than one
unit in return. This trade-o illustrates the social dilemma situation as contributing to the
joint project is socially ecient but not in the interest of the individual. The return (relative
to the costs) that each member receives of one unit contributed to the group project is what
the literature has termed the `marginal per capita return'. Thereby the distinction is made
between what other group members receive of a contribution, named `external return,' and
what the contributing member receives, named `internal return'. In our experiment, we
use the external marginal per capita return to model ability: contributions of persons with
higher ability generate higher external marginal returns for other group members. In order
to ensure that costs of contributions are the same for dierent levels of ability, we keep the
internal returns constant for all group members. We are interested in contribution behavior
of individuals in heterogeneous groups that comprise of two ability types, high and low, and
this under three levels of information about the abilities of their peers.
Our experiment makes two contributions to the literature. It is the rst to study the eect
of ability, i.e., external returns, in heterogeneous groups on contributions separately from the
costs of contributing, i.e., internal returns. And, secondly, it is the rst to investigate how
information on team mates' abilities aect contributions.
Our ndings can be summarized as follows: When group members are not aware of
the heterogeneity in their group, both ability types make the same nominal contributions.
When individuals are aware that group members vary in ability, the average propensity to
contribute increases. However, we nd that the information structure evokes dierent relative
contribution patterns between ability types. When detailed information is available, i.e., on
the type of the contributor, high types contribute more than low types. In contrast, low
types contribute more when group members are aware of the heterogeneity but contributions
cannot be linked to types.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related research
and places the current study in the literature. Section 3 describes the experimental design
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and the procedure and gives a descriptive overview of the data. We present our empirical
model of individual contribution behavior in section 4 and results in section 5. Section 6
discusses our results in the light of the literature and concludes.
2 Literature
In this section, we summarize related results from the public goods literature and position
our paper. Thereby we focus on three lines of research. The rst one studies the eect
of marginal per capita returns on contributions between groups with dierent marginal per
capita returns and on contributions within groups whose members vary in their marginal per
capita return. The second one looks at variations of internal and external marginal returns.
And the third one investigates the eect of information on contributions. For comprehensive
surveys on public goods in experimental economics beyond this subset of the literature see
Ledyard (1995) and Camerer (2003).
2.1 Dierent marginal per capita returns between homogeneous and within
heterogeneous groups
Isaac and Walker (1998) and Bagnoli and McKee (1991) study the eect of marginal per
capita returns on contributions. They compare homogeneous groups with high marginal
returns to those with low marginal returns. One main result of these studies is that groups
with higher marginal returns have a higher propensity to contribute. This nding seems to
be robust across studies and for dierent marginal returns and numbers of group members.
Fisher et al. (1995), Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997), Tan (2008) and Reuben and Riedl (2013)
study behavior in heterogeneous groups consisting of members with high and low marginal
returns to that of homogeneous groups. In line with the research of Isaac and Walker (1998)
and Bagnoli and McKee (1991), these studies nd that in heterogeneous groups individuals
whose contributions have higher marginal returns tend to have a higher propensity to con-
tribute to the public good than do members of the same group with lower marginal returns.
There are important dierences how these four studies introduce heterogeneity in the return
function of the public good that are summarized in Table 1.
The rst line of Table 1 presents the return of a standard public goods experiment with
homogeneous groups whose members all have the same marginal per capita return (). Isaac
and Walker (1998) and Bagnoli and McKee (1991) employ this standard return function
and vary the marginal return between groups. Fisher et al. (1995), Palfrey and Prisbrey
(1997) and Reuben and Riedl (2013), introduce heterogeneity within groups by varying the
individual costs of contribution. They assign dierent marginal per capita returns (i 6= j)
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Individual return Examples
from the public good
(1) 
P
8j cj Standard game: BM91, IW98
(2) i
P
8j cj FISW95, PP97, RR13
(3)
P
8j jcj T08
(4) ci + 
P
8j 6=i cj CDP92, GG89, GHL02, PIB01
(5) ci +
P
8j 6=i jcj this experiment, with  = 0
Table 1: Payo structures of public goods experiments that vary the MPCR.
ci = contribution of i;  =marginal per capita return,  =internal return,  =external return; stan-
dard public goods game:  = i = j =  = i = j ; 8i 6= j.
BM91=Bagnoli and McKee (1991), CDP92=Carter et al. (1992), FISW95=Fisher et al. (1995),
GG89=Goetze and Galderisi (1989), GHL02=Goeree et al. (2002), IW98=Isaac and Walker (1998),
PIB01=Packard et al. (2001), PP97=Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997), RR13=Reuben and Riedl (2013),
T08=Tan (2008).
For the ease of presentation return functions are normalized by the return from the private good.
within groups, as presented in the second line of Table 1, which results in dierent benets
from the public good for others. The third line shows how Tan (2008) directly varies the
eect a person's contribution has on the benets of the public good and thus she alters
indirectly the costs of contribution.
Results from those six studies suggest that persons react to the costs and benets of
contributing in homogeneous as well as in heterogeneous groups. However, these results
confound the eects of costs and benets. In Tan, the higher marginal benet comes at
lower net costs for higher productivity contributors. And vice versa in the other ve studies,
lower costs of contribution result in larger benets from the public good for contributors
with higher marginal returns.
To avoid these confounding eects, we allow the marginal per capita return to dier
between the contributor and the other group members. We follow Carter et al. (1992) and
refer to the marginal return from the public good to the contributor as \internal return" and
the marginal return per capita from the public good for other group members as \external
return." In our study, ability represents by how much a group member's contribution of
one unit increases the public good for others, hence ability is the sum of external returns of
members who benet from one unit contributed by another member. Thereby we look at
heterogeneous groups with two distinct levels of ability, high and low. We keep the costs of
contributing to the public good constant at one by assigning the same internal return of zero
to all group members. The way we model the return from the public good is shown in the
fth line of Table 1.
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2.2 Varying internal and external returns
The eects of varying internal and external returns separately has so far only been studied
in homogeneous groups, where all members have the same internal and the same external
return, however, internal and external return could be dierent. The fourth line of Table 1
presents the structure of the public goods return with separate internal () and external ()
returns (with  6= ).
Goetze and Galderisi (1989) and Carter et al. (1992) compare groups with low and high
internal and external returns in a 2x2 between-subjects design. Both studies nd larger
contributions when external returns are high, indicating that subjects react even to benets
the public goods provides only for others. Carter et al. (1992). nd this eect to be present
in the last 5 periods of the experiment at a signicance level of 0.01 but to have disappeared
in the last period.1 Packard et al. (2001) replicate partly Carter et al. (1992) and report
that even when internal returns are zero, behavior follows the general qualitative pattern in
standard public goods of substantial contributions in the rst rounds followed by a decay in
later rounds. They also nd that initial contributions of groups whose members have zero
internal and non-zero external return are the same as those of groups with the same (non-
zero) internal and external returns. However, the contributions decay faster and contribution
levels in the nal rounds are signicantly lower for groups with zero internal return.
These three experiments employed low and high returns of similar magnitude across
experiments { around 0.3 and 0.8 (and 0 for the internal return in Carter et al. (1992).) in a
between-subjects design with groups of 4. Subjects interacted only once, either in a one-shot
experiment or with rematching groups every period in all experiments, with the exception
of Packard et al. (2001), where the groups composition remained the same for 10 periods.
Goeree et al. (2002) study one-shot within-subjects designs with 12 treatments combining
internal returns similar to previous studies (either 0.4 and 0.8) but a wider range of external
returns (0.4, 0.8, 1.2, and 2.4) and groups with 2 and 4 members. They conrm earlier results
that subjects react to an increase of the external return by contributing more. To sum up,
these four studies provide evidence that persons in homogeneous groups react positively to
external returns, even when internal returns are low { even as low as zero.
1Conditional on external returns, contributions are higher when internal returns are higher. Although,
only Carter et al. (1992). nd this eect to be signicant.
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2.3 Information
In all studies mentioned above return rates are common knowledge amongst group members.
In our study we vary information group members have about the return rates of others.
Up to this point in time, little is known about the eect of information on contributions
in public goods experiments. However, a few studies exist that vary the aggregation level
of the information that group members receive after each round about contributions of
others (Sell and Wilson (1991), Croson and Marks (1998), Andreoni and Petrie (2004)).2
Complementary, Marks and Croson (1999) look at the information about the distribution of
valuations for the public good in groups whose members vary in their valuation.
Sell and Wilson (1991) nd that information on individual contributions of other group
members increases average contributions { compared to providing information on aggregate
contributions, or no information at all { and suggest that such behavior can partly be ex-
plained by the fact that trigger strategies and positive reinforcement can be better applied
when information on individual contributions is available. Andreoni and Petrie (2004) and
Croson and Marks (1998) nd signicantly larger contributions when { in addition to provid-
ing information on individual contributions of other group members { individual contributors
could be identied, either by a digital photograph or by subject ID numbers.
Marks and Croson (1999) study threshold public goods games with three levels of infor-
mation that group members have about the valuations of others.3 Their results suggest that
when there is no information on individual contributions of other group members, informa-
tion on the valuations of public goods in a heterogeneous environment does not alter the
aggregate level of contributions.
In our study, we look at three conditions in which we vary the information group members
have about the heterogeneity of the external returns of other group members but provide
information about individual (nominal) contributions of other group members. In the base-
line treatment, group members are informed about their own internal and external returns
as well as individual nominal contributions of others in the previous period. In the other
two treatments, participants are additionally informed about the internal and external re-
turns of other group members. Furthermore, only in the third treatment, participants are
additionally informed about which ability type made a particular contribution. This design
2In the eld, Ayres et al. (2012) look at the eect of information about energy usage of peers on energy
consumption. They report high energy consumers to reduce their consumption after learning about other's
consumption.
3In all conditions subjects only knew whether the sum of all contributions was above the threshold, in
which case the public good was provided. In the other case, every contributor was reimbursed his or her
contribution.
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allows us to control the level of information about heterogeneity in the external return and to
examine how the structure of information aects voluntary contributions in a heterogenous
environment.
3 The experiment
The experiment was designed to uncover two kinds of eects: rst, the eect of ability on
contributions to joint projects in heterogeneous groups and, second, the role of information
about this heterogeneity on dierences in contributions between types.
3.1 Experimental design
In the experiment, 6 subjects form a group and interact over 15 periods. In every period,
each member has to decide how to divide his private endowment of 17 tokens between a
private account and a group project. The return of a token contributed to the group project
benets all group members, except the contributor. Benets depend on the ability of the
contributor that could be high or low. Each group consists of 3 high and 3 low ability types,
hereafter referred to as H -types and L-types. Internal returns, that represent how much
the contributor himself benets from his own contribution, are zero for all group members.4
Separating the marginal per capita return into an external and internal return allows to
introduce variation in the ability to contribute to the group project while keeping the costs
of contribution constant across types.5 Furthermore, in order to assure that group members
face a payo structure that is symmetric, every individual benets only from contributions
of an equal number of both ability types. Hence, both ability types are equally accounted for
in everyone's payo function.6 This implies equal payos to all members when all members
make the same contribution.
We distinguish between `nominal' and `eective' contributions. The former refers to how
many tokens are allocated from the endowment to the group project, and the latter takes
ability into account and measures by how many tokens the group project increases. After
4Packard et al. (2001) also employ internal rates that are equal to zero, see our Section 2.2.
5In fact, Carter et al. (1992) and Goeree et al. (2002) have shown that contributions are sensitive to both,
external and internal returns. We concentrate only on the the eect of external returns, i.e. contributions
from which others benet, and vary those marginal benets while we keep private costs via the private benets
of contributing constant across individuals.
6Consider a group composed of six members; three H -types and three L-types. Individual i's payo from
the public good is based on the contributions by the two other subjects of the same type and two randomly
selected subjects of the other type. Consequently, by excluding the contributions of the individual him- or
herself and of one member of the opposite type, we maintain the symmetry of individual payo functions.
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each period, all group members' individual nominal contributions to the project are revealed
anonymously to the whole group.
The payo function of group member i can be summarized as follows:
i = w   ci + ci +
X
8j 6=i;k
jcj with  = 0;  2 fH ; Lg; i 6= k; i; k 2 f1; : : : ; ng
with w = 17 being the endowment and w   ci the share kept in the private account. The
individual (nominal) contribution ci increases the joint project for another group member by
ici. In total (n 2) group members benet from ci, hence, the eective contribution of ci to
the joint project is (n 2)ici. The eective contribution of one token represents the `ability'
of i : (n   2)i, which depends on the `external return' (i 2 fH ; Lg). Member i does not
benet from the own contribution, as the `internal return'  = 0. But i benets from the
contributions of others
P
8j 6=i;k jcj , excluding one member with the opposite ability than i
(i 6= k; i; k 2 f1; : : : ; ng) in order to keep the payo structure symmetric.
Our treatment variable, the level of information, varies in two ways: rst, subjects either
do or do not receive information on the distribution of ability types within the group, and
second, the feedback information about the nominal contributions of all group members does
or does not identify contributors by their type. We study the following information scenarios
that are again summarized in the top part of Table 2.
In the No-info treatment, subjects know their own ability, i.e., they are informed about
their own eective contribution of one token, but not the distribution of types within their
group.7 In the Part-info and Full-info treatments, the distribution of types is explicitly
stated in the instructions. Additionally, the feedback information in the Full-info treatment
allows subjects to link an individual nominal contribution to the contributor's type. In sum,
the three treatments gradually change the level of information about the heterogeneity in
ability within the group and whether the ability type of an individual contributor is known
or not.
Each information treatment consists of nine groups, each group comprising three H -type
and three L-type members. A subject remains the same type and interacts in the same
group throughout the whole experiment. Eective contributions per token, i.e. the `ability
to contribute', are 3:99 for H -types and 1:33 for L-types. Hence, the external return of
7The instructions never used the word \ability" and left open the possibility that dierences in ability
between group members may exist. While this approach implies loosing some control over group members'
beliefs concerning other members' abilities, it implements the No-info treatment, our benchmark treatment,
in a way that is as close as possible to the further two treatments.
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Treatments (between-subjects design)
Information No-Info Part-Info Full-Info
about ...
Own ability Own ability and Own ability and
... ability distribution of distribution of
in the group ability in group ability in group
... identity of without identication without identication with identication
contributors of contributor's type of contributor's type of contributor's type
Descriptive Statistics: contributions
Mean 0.42 0.54 0.56
(0.25) (0.28) (0.29)
Mean L-type 0.42 0.59 0.50
(0.22) (0.28) (0.28)
Mean H -type 0.43 0.50 0.62
(0.28) (0.27) (0.28)
N 54 54 54
Periods 15 15 15
Total Nobs 810 810 810
Table 2: Summary of experimental design and descriptive statistics (mean contributions
also by type - all as proportion of endowment, standard deviations in parenthesis, number
of participants and number of periods.)
one token contributed by a H -type is close to 1, whereas the one of L-types is only close
to 1=3.8 After all group members made their contribution decisions, individual payos
are computed and group members are informed about their payos. Additionally, a table
is displayed containing the history of nominal contributions by each group member in all
previous periods. The order of individual contributions in the history table is randomized
so that contributions cannot be attributed to a specic group member.9 In the Full-info
treatment, the history table also displayed the type of each contributor.
3.2 Experimental procedure
The computerized experiment was conducted in eight sessions with a total of 162 undergrad-
uate students (54 per treatment) from Jena University at the laboratory of the Max Planck
8Because of our payment scheme, contributions of one group member benetted 4 other group members,
hence the exact external returns of H-types and L-types were 0:9975 and 0:3325. External returns used in
our experiment are comparable to those in the literature (see section 2.2).
9Participants know that they benet from contributions of \four other group members" (No-info treat-
ment) and \two of each type" (Part-info and Full-info treatment), but they are not informed about which
of the displayed nominal contributions they benet from. Therefore, in the Part-info treatment it is hardly
possible to infer the type of the contributor from displayed nominal contributions, or, similarly, to deduce in
the No-info treatment that there were dierent types.
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Institute of Economics in Jena, Germany. Participants were on average 24 years old and 43%
of them were men. Recruitment was performed with the help of an online system (ORSEE,
Greiner, 2004), and the experiment was executed using the software zTree (Fischbacher,
2007).
In order to capture some of the individual heterogeneity amongst participants that might
inuence the behavior in the experiment, participants completed a standard personality
questionnaire after the experiment, resulting in a personality index for each participant.10
The personality index of our participants ranges from one to nine with a mean value of 4.35.
A sample copy of the instructions is included in Appendix A.
At the end of each session, subjects received their payo from the experiment and a show-
up fee of 2.5 Euros in cash. Experimental earnings were counted in points and exchanged
for Euros, with 80 points corresponding to 1 Euro. Subjects earned on average 5.7 Euros for
the 15 rounds, which lasted on average 30 minutes.11
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
In total we observe 2,430 contribution decisions for the whole experiment, breaking down
into 3 treatments with 9 groups per treatment each with 6 members who decide in every
of the 15 periods how much to contribute to the joint project. The bottom part of Table
2 reports the mean of the average individual contributions over 15 periods as a proportion
of their endowment. Across the treatments, participants contribute about 50 percent of the
endowment. The average contributions in the treatments Part-info and Full-info appear
slightly higher than that in the No-info treatment. Table 2 also reports mean contributions
by ability type. They appear similar for both types in the No-info treatment, but dier
for the other two treatments. Aggregated average contributions of L-types are higher in the
Part-info treatment and lower in the Full-info treatment compared to those of H -types.12
10We administered the revised version of the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (Cattell et al., 1993)
in its ocial German version by Schneewind and Graf (1998). In particular, our personality index is derived
from the individual score in the global personality scale that captures conscientiousness or self-control. This
personality index reects several traits that are associated with the tendency to rely on rules and socially
accepted behavior (Conn and Rieke, 1994). The index is expressed in sten-scores that can range from one
to ten. Sten values are derived from comparing test scores to the results of a norm population. The average
(expected) sten value in the German population is 5.5 with a standard deviation of 2, whereby higher sten-
values indicate higher awareness and personal reliance on societal norms and rules.
11Each session consists of two phases each lasting 15 periods. In the second phase, groups were confronted
with one of the two other treatments in order to study path dependency of contribution behavior. In this
article we consider only the rst phase. Average earnings for the whole experiment (including both phases)
were about 11 Euros.
12Aggregation of contributions per group leaves us with 9 observations per treatment and allows us to
perform standard non-parametric tests. Ranksum tests however cannot reject the null hypothesis that types
within treatments make the same contributions at conventional levels of signicance. The lack of signicant
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The dynamics in the experiment are shown in Figure 1 that plots the average contribution
as a proportion of the endowment by treatment across the 15 periods. In all three treat-
ments, the average contribution generally decreases over the course of the experiment, with
a stronger decay towards the end. There are noticeable dierences across the treatments
in how contribution behavior evolves over time. In the No-info treatment, contributions
continuously decrease over time conform with behavior in other public good experiments.
In contrast, in the other two treatments with information about heterogeneity, average con-
tributions seem to increase initially before following the general trend of decay. In the
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Figure 1: Average nominal contributions as a proportion of the endowment for the three
treatments (No-info, Part-info and Full-info)
following, we estimate an empirical model of contribution behavior that allows us to exploit
the information at the individual level and to control for individual heterogeneity.
4 Empirical model of contribution behavior
In this section, we present a panel data Tobit model in order to quantify the eect of
information and ability on contribution behavior over time while controlling for individual
heterogeneity. The choice of the empirical model is guided by the dynamic nature of the data
and the fact that contributions are bounded below and on top. Our model allows individual
contributions to depend not only on the treatment variables, but also on observable and
unobservable personal characteristics as well as time. This way, we are able to provide
statistical evidence of how information about heterogeneity aects behavior and to gain
variation in the analysis of aggregated data is not surprising. Though necessary for appropriate non-parametric
testing, aggregation neglects information contained in individuals' data. It is very likely that information
exerts its eect through dynamic interaction over time.
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more insight on how individual contributions evolve over time.
In our model, we describe the proportion that individual i contributes from his or her
own endowment in period t, y?it, as a function:
y?it = 0 + 1Part-infoi + 2Full-infoi + hi! + f(t) + xi + uit (1)
where 0 indicates the basic contribution level. We capture the inuence of dierent levels
of information about heterogeneity in ability by treatment dummies, with the No-info treat-
ment as a baseline. Parameter 1 measures the inuence of information about heterogeneity
and 2 measures the eect when ability can be additionally linked to specic contributions.
Values of Part-info (Full-info) are equal to one if i was in treatment Part-info (Full-info)
and zero otherwise. The vector h contains a dummy variable for ability (Highi = 1 if i is
a H -type and zero otherwise) and interaction terms of ability and information treatments.
The parameter vector ! measures the eects of ability type across treatments. We control
for time trends by including f(t), a function of time. The vector xi represents individual ob-
servable characteristics (age, gender, personality index). Their inuence on contributions is
captured by the parameter vector . Idiosyncratic errors, uit, are assumed to be independent
of ability and other individual characteristics in xi.
Given the design of the experiment, individual contributions to the joint project are
doubly censored, rst at the lowest contribution level of 0 units and second at the highest
contribution level of 17 units, the endowment in each period.13 We therefore use a standard
regression doubly censored Tobit model to estimate the relation for the latent proportions
y?it that a group member i contributed (contributioni=17) described in model (1) with
yit
8>>><>>>:
= 0 if y?it  0;
= y?it if 0 < y
?
it < 1;
= 1 if y?it  1:
(2)
We estimate two specications of the model in equation (1).14 Both specications include
the same set of background characteristics and treatment variables but vary in the way time
eects are modeled. In specication 1, the time trend is modeled non-parametrically by
including dummy variables for each period (f(t) = t1t with 1t being an indicator function
for period t for t > 1 and f(1) = 0). We found an inverse-U relation between time and
13In fact, 23% and 21% of all contribution decisions are at the upper and lower limits, respectively.
14We thank Charles Bellemare for providing his tobit model OX code.
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contributions and were interested whether this trend is common to both types and apparent
in all information conditions. Therefore, in a second specication, we model the time trend as
a quadratic function that includes interaction eects with ability and information scenarios:15
f(t) = 10  t+ 20  t2 + Interaction(t;Highi;Part-infoi;Full-infoi): (3)
This allows accounting for both non-linear eects of periods and interactions with the dif-
ferent treatments while minimizing the loss of degrees of freedom.
5 Results
In this section, we report briey on parameter estimates from both specications (shown
in Tables 3 and 4 in appendix B) and we concentrate on presenting the marginal eects of
ability and information on contributions. We also investigate whether and how types react
dierently to the separate levels of information.
5.1 Parameter estimates
The estimated parameters of specication 1 indicate that information about heterogeneity
has a signicantly positive impact on contributions (1; 2 > 0).
16 We nd that women tend
to make signicantly smaller contributions (2 < 0) and that age and personality index have
signicant but relatively small negative inuences on contributions. All eects are signicant
at p = 2:5% or less. Finally, the period dummy coecients reveal a non-linear time trend,
indicating an increase in contribution levels until period three and a strong decrease over the
last three periods of the experiment.
Results of specication 2, that incorporates the time trend function (3), reveal that the
eect of information materializes largely through dynamic interactions over time and that
this eect varies by type. More precisely, information about heterogeneity has a non-linear
15The detailed time function is given by:
f(t) = 10  t+ 11  t  Part-infoi + 12  t  Full-infoi
+ 13  t  Highi + 14  t  Highi  Part-infoi + 15  t  Highi  Full-infoi
+ 20  t2 + 21  t2  Part-infoi + 22  t2  Full-infoi
+ 23  t2  Highi + 24  t2  Highi  Part-infoi + 25  t2  Highi  Full-infoi
16In the Full-info treatment, this increase is almost exclusively driven by the more productive type (2 <
!2). In the No-info treatment, H -types contribute signicantly less compared to their L-type colleagues
(!0 < 0), but the size of the eect is relatively small and there is practically no dierence in this respect when
looking at the Part-info treatment (!1 not signicantly dierent from zero).
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eect on individual contributions of both ability types. Instead of the standard monotonic
decay, contributions increase before they diminish (11; 12 > 0 and 21; 22 < 0). More-
over, additional information counterbalances the declining trend for contributions of H -types
(24; 25 > 0). These parameter estimates are not individually signicant. In order to test
whether their joint eect is signicant and to assess the global picture of those individual
interactions, we compute expected contributions and calculate marginal eects using our
estimated parameters.17
5.2 Marginal eects on contributions
Ability
The upper panels in Figure 2 show predicted average nominal contributions as a proportion
of the endowment for H - and L-types in each treatment, while the lower panels show the
marginal eects of ability on contributions with 95% condence bounds. The upper left
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Figure 2: Upper panels: Predicted average contributions (as a proportion of the initial
endowment) over time for each treatment and type.
Lower panels: Marginal eects of ability on contributions for each treatment. (The graphs
project the dierence in relative nominal contributions between H -types and L-types with
95% condence bounds.)
panel in Figure 2 depicts the No-info treatment. The picture suggests that, in the absence
of information about heterogeneity, both types make the same nominal contributions that
exhibit a similar monotonic decay. The marginal eects analysis for this case, presented in
the lower left panel, conrms this observation. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
17Appendix C presents the details of how we estimated the marginal eects.
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dierence between types throughout periods 1 to 12. In the last three periods, though, L-
types contribute signicantly more albeit not very much with around two percentage points.
The other four panels illustrate the case for the treatments with more information. Here,
contributions of both types are not monotonically declining but rather parabolic, depicted
by the tendency for average contributions to increase initially before following the standard
pattern of decay. Moreover, from the lower middle and lower right panels, we learn that
contribution behavior diers signicantly between types and also between the Part-info and
the Full-info treatments.
The upper and lower middle panels illustrate behavior in the Part-info treatment. There,
the predicted average contribution of L-types is higher than that of H -types by about 5%
to 10% of their endowments. The dierence in contribution behavior between H - and L-
types is reversed in the Full-info treatment, which is illustrated in the upper and lower right
panels of Figure 2. When contributions can be linked to the ability type of the contributor,
H -types give signicantly more than L-types. The dierence amounts to around 15% of the
endowment and remains constant over time as contributions of both types follow the same
time trend.
Information by ability type
Providing information about heterogeneity obviously aects contribution behavior of types
in dierent ways. To test whether these eects of information on contributions by type are
signicant, we compute marginal eects presented in Figure 3, for H -types in the upper
panels and of L-types in the lower panels.
The upper left panel shows that in the rst half of the experiment, H -types contribute the
same, but from period 8 onwards they contribute more when they have information about
the heterogeneity than when they have not. When all group members can additionally link
contributions to ability types as shown in the upper right panel, H -types contribute between
10 and 20 percent more of their initial endowment. However, this eect is decreasing over
time and in the last two periods, contributions no longer dier signicantly. Finally, the
upper middle panel indicates that H -types' contributions are around 20 percent higher when
they have information about heterogeneity and contributions cannot be linked to ability
types compared to when they have not. This eect is relatively stable over time.
We nd very dierent marginal eects for L-types, shown in the lower panels of Figure
3. The lower left and middle panels indicate that information on heterogeneity generally
increases the contributions of L-types.The eect is about 2 times stronger when there is
15
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Figure 3: Marginal eects of information on contribution separately for H -types and L-types.
(The graphs project the dierence in relative nominal contributions between two information
scenarios with 95% condence bounds.)
only information about heterogeneity (lower left panel) compared to the situation wjere
contributions can be linked to ability type (lower middle panel). The dierence between
both eects is signicant and visualized in the lower right panel.
6 Discussion and conclusion
This study sheds light on the interplay between the ability to contribute to a joint project and
the level of information available on other members ability. Our main results are threefold.
First, ability does not aect contributions without additional information on the heterogene-
ity in ability within the group. Second, average contributions increase with ability, when
persons are aware about the heterogeneity and contributions can be linked to the contrib-
utors type. Third, contributions are inversely related to ability, when persons are aware of
the heterogeneity but cannot link contributions to the contributors type.
Our rst result is novel and nds {to the best of our knowledge{ no equivalent in the
public goods literature. While individual decision experiments on altruism demonstrate that
individuals react to changes in the level of the eciency of giving (Andreoni and Miller
(2002), Karlan and List (2007)), we learn from our rst result in conjunction with our
other results that individuals who contribute to joint projects do not react to their ability
when they have no information other than their group members contributions. Only with
additional information about others ability to contribute, the dierent types vary in their
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levels of nominal contributions. Our result is thus important to understand the behaviour
in groups that are heterogeneous with respect to their members ability to contribute to the
joint project. It adds to the public goods literature on varying the marginal per capita return
that has so far exclusively focused on settings with full information.
Our second nding is in line with the results reported in two strands of the public goods
literature. The rst separates internal and external returns and the second investigates the
eect of varying the marginal per capita return (see Section 2.2). These studies suggest that
individuals react to the costs and benets of contributing in homogeneous as well as in het-
erogeneous groups when the environment oers full information on individual contributions
and the contributors type. What distinguishes our study from these two strands of the liter-
ature is that we look at heterogeneous groups in contrast to the literature on homogeneous
groups with dierent external and internal returns. Moreover, in contrast to the hitherto
literature on heterogeneous groups where everyone benets from own contributions, we avoid
the confound of costs and benets of contributing. Our experiment advances the existing
literature by isolating the eects of ability to contribute from the cost of contributing {in
other words: the eects of the external from the internal return{ in heterogeneous groups.
From our results we conclude that ndings in the existing literature can be partly explained
by the full information structure employed in these experiments. Further, under full infor-
mation, the ndings of previous studies on groups with heterogeneous marginal per capita
returns are robust to whether or not an individual benets from own contributions.
Our third nding that low ability types contribute signicantly more than high ability
types when there is only partial information relates closely to what Fisher et al. (1995) call
the \poisoning-of-the-well" eect (p. 265, footnote 11). We nd that - depending on which
reference treatment we use - we could either denote behaviour as \poisoning-of-the-able"
when comparing to the full-information treatment, which is in line with Fisher et al. (1995),
or we could call the behaviour \enthusiasm-of-the-less-able" when comparing to contributions
in the no-information treatment. As we report in subsection 5.2, this dierence between
types becomes smaller over time or reverses when full information is available on the type
of the contributor. Fisher et al. (1995) report as well the impact of information as their
eect disappeared when the experimenters emphasised more strongly the heterogeneity in
the groups to their participants.
In summary, we nd the eect of ability on contributions is linked to the information
group members have about each other. There is strong evidence in laboratory experiments
and eld studies that information about others aects contribution to public goods (see
17
Section 2.3). Andreoni and Petrie (2004), who also observe an increase in contributions
when individual contributions can be identied, suggest that individuals compare their own
contributions to some standard that can be established when contributions of others are
known.
Our results complement those of Andreoni and Petrie (2004) by adding the aspect of
heterogeneity. We nd that in heterogeneous groups types react dierently to changes in the
information about heterogeneity and to changes in the information about the type of the
contributor. As information is likely to foster social comparisons and to clarify a standard,
it is not surprising that individuals react to available information. Such a standard may
represent a social norm, but which norm is established in groups with heterogeneous agents
is an empirical question. From the literature on fairness and justice norms one can derive
dierent contribution norms for heterogeneous environments, based either on eciency or
equity (Konow (2003)). By revealing the type-identity of contributors, type specic standards
or norms can emerge more easily, which gives an idea -at least empirically- of what norm is
in place in groups with members who dier in their abilities. Given our results, it seems that
the standard emerging in our setting is that of ecient contributions, with high ability types
making higher nominal, hence, eective contributions. Our experimental results suggest that
eciency motives emerge with sucient information and social exposure: when identication
of ability is linked to individual behaviour, high ability types contribute more than under no
information about heterogeneous ability.
We conjecture from our results that ecient contributions by high ability team mem-
bers result from a social norm rather than representing a private concern. Thus, ecient
contributions are more likely in environments with social approval or social pressure, for
example when the identity of the contributor is revealed. Whether eciency is the most
desirable norm from the point of view of a policy maker or team members themselves is
another important question left for future research.
We conclude by noting that information about heterogeneity, rather than heterogeneity
itself, and the extent to which contributions can be identied are crucial to understand
how heterogeneity aects public goods provision. We consider our ndings important when
deciding on the information to be transmitted in teams, for example about the (nominal)
performance of individual team members, or when evaluating dierent disclosure practices
of fund raising agencies.
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Appendices
A Instructions (for online appendix)
This is a translated version of the German instructions used for the experiment. We provide
here the version for H-types in the No-info treatment. Dierences between treatments are
denoted as comments in the text. Comments by the authors included here as information to
the reader but not in the original instructions can be found in square brackets and footnotes.
Welcome to this experiment! These instructions are for your private information. Please
read the instruction carefully. Please do not talk to the other participants. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand. We will come to you and answer your questions privately.
All amounts are displayed in Points. The exchange rate is: 80 points = 1 Euro.
The experiment consists of two phases of 15 periods each. Before each phase, all partici-
pants are randomly assigned to groups of six. The group's composition remains the same
throughout the experiment.
Detailed Information
You are a member of a group of six. At the beginning of each period, every group member
receives 17 points. In every period each group member decides how to split the 17 points.
You can transfer points to a private account or to a group project. Your period payo is the
sum of your income from the private account and the income from the group project.
Your payo from the private account:
For each point you transfer to the private account, you receive a payo of one
point. This means that if you transfer an amount of x points to your private account, your
payo increases by x points. Nobody except you benets from your private account.
Your payo from the group project:
The payo you receive from the project is derived as follows. You receive one quarter of the
project's outcome generated by four other members of your group. The project's outcome is
the sum of all transfers, whereby each transfer to the project is multiplied by an individual
factor[, either 1.33 or 3.99. Two of the four members of your group whose transfers will
benet you have a factor of 1.33, and the other two have a factor of 3.99. Individual factors
were randomly assigned to each group member in the beginning of the experiment such that
three members were assigned a factor of 1.33 and three were assigned a factor of 3.99. Each
member retains the same factor throughout the whole experiment.]18 The payos are calcu-
lated in the same manner for all six group members.
Each point you transfer to the group project generates 3.99 points.19
Please note that four other members of your group benet from your transfer to the project,
but you do not.
One period proceeds as follows:
In each period, you receive 17 points. You decide how many of your 17 points to transfer to
your private account and how many to the project. You will make this decision by simply
deciding how many points you wish to transfer to the project. The points you transfer to
your private account are automatically calculated as the dierence of the 17 points and the
18The information between square brackets was not given in the No-info treatment but was given in the
Part-info and Full-info treatments.
19This was the factor for H -types. L-types had a factor of 1.33.
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points you transferred to the project. After every group member has made a decision, the
payo for this period is calculated.
At the end of each period, you will receive the following information:
 The number of points that each member in your group transferred to the project
(Please note that the numbers of points are listed in random order, i.e. the sequence
of transfers is dierent in each period.)
 Your payo from the private account
 Your payo from the project
 Your payo from the period
 Your total payo from all previous periods in this phase
Then, the next period will start. In the second period, you will be shown a table (like the
one below) with the following information for all previous periods: your transfer to the group
project, your payo in a period, and transfers made by the other 5 members of your group
[with the information about their individual factors (H for 3.99 and L for 1.33)].20 For each
period, the transfers of group members are presented in random order, so columns showing
the contributions of the other 5 group members will not correspond to the same person for
all periods.
Transfer to the joint project
You Other group members
[H] [H] [L] [L] [L]
Period 1 2 3 4 5 Payo
1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
In total, you will interact over 15 periods in each phase. You will receive more detailed
information on phase 2 after phase 1 ends.
We will ask you to complete a questionnaire after the experiment is completed. At the end of
the experiment, your nal payo will be converted into Euros and paid to you immediately.
Please remain seated until we call the number of your computer.
Thank you very much for your participation!
20Only participants in the Full-info treatment received the information allowing them to link a contribution
to the contributor's type.
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B Estimation Results
Specication 1 Specication 2
Variable Parameter Coecient T-value Coecient T-value
Constant 0 0.843 8.953 0.934 5.925
Part-info 1 0.210 12.299 0.086 0.428
Full-info 2 0.100 5.955 0.024 0.122
H -type !0 -0.044 -2.422 -0.026 -0.119
H -type Part-info !1 -0.012 -0.498 0.037 0.124
H -type Full-info !2 0.293 12.801 0.329 1.197
linear Time trend 10 0.013 0.276
Part-info 11 0.062 1.024
Full-info 12 0.054 0.892
H -type 13 0.009 0.141
H -type Part-info 14 -0.070 -0.761
H -type Full-info 15 -0.033 -0.393
quadratic Time trend 20 -0.002 -0.862
Part-info 21 -0.005 -1.245
Full-info 22 -0.004 -1.166
H -type 23 -0.001 -0.286
H -type Part-info 24 0.006 1.111
H -type Full-info 25 0.003 0.547
Background characteristics Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes No
Number of Observations 2430 2430
Number of Parameters 23 21
 0.584 62.539 0.584 64.139
Log-Likelihood value -33172.7 -33155.7
Table 3: Estimation results for nominal contribution behavior (dependent variable: propor-
tion that an individual contributes from his or her initial endowment).
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Specication 1 Specication 2
Variable Parameter Coecient T-value Coecient T-value
Age 1 -0.008 -4.851 -0.008 -4.839
Gender 2 -0.239 -19.911 -0.239 -19.840
Personality index 3 -0.029 -9.239 -0.029 -9.277
Time dummies 2 0.147 0.933
3 0.207 1.509
4 0.180 1.364
5 0.131 1.084
6 0.090 0.790
7 0.034 0.301
8 0.066 0.524
9 0.054 0.458
10 -0.043 -0.385
11 -0.048 -0.432
12 -0.118 -0.973
13 -0.146 -1.367
14 -0.225 -2.167
15 -0.413 -3.808
Table 4: Parameter estimates of background characteristics and, for specication 1, the time
trend.
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C Marginal eects of information and of ability types
We calculate marginal eects as the dierence between the expected proportion of contribu-
tion for two realizations of a variable of interest. For example, the eect of ability on average
nominal contributions in the Full-info treatment is given by
HLi;t = E(yigtjxi; t;High = 1;Part-info = 0;Full-info = 1) (4)
  E(yigtjxi; t;High = 0;Part-info = 0;Full-info = 1)
for which we calculate the expected contribution levels using the parameter estimates of
specication 2 (model in equation (1) and equation (3)) to compute y?igt. Finally, we apply
the censoring rule in equation (2) to obtain yigt. We compute the eect in equation (4) for
all individuals who participated in the Full-info treatment and for each time period. We
average over all individual eects 1=(NT )
P
8t;i
HL
i;t to obtain the total eect. We simulate
the variance of the marginal eects, that is used to calculate the t-values, using 100 Halton
draws (see Train (2003) and Judd (1999)).21
21We discard the rst 50 draws of a sequence, using draws 51-150.
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